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Abstract 
7KHIUHTXHQWXVHRIWKHXQLI\LQJWHUP¶EHKDYLRXUDO HFRQRPLFV·LQFRQWHPSRUDU\HFRQRPLFWKHRULHVDQG
English housing policies masks divergent accounts of human ability, search processes and housing 
markets. The resurgence in interest in the behaviours of housing markets brings exchange mechanisms 
and housing search processes into sharp focus; this paper provides and applies a framework to assess the 
compatibility of behavioural economics theories of housing search. Assessing the ontological 
commitments of theories is possible through analysis of their conceptualisations of human ability, the 
search process and the structure and operation of the market. This assessment reveals a spectrum of 
GLYHUVLW\GLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQ¶old·DQG¶QHZ· behavioural economics are evident despite there being only 
limited acknowledgement of this variation. Whilst significant contributions to housing economics have 
WDNHQSODFH DFURVV WKH VSHFWUXP FOHDUGLVWLQFWLRQV DUHQHHGHG WRSUHYHQWSROLF\PDNHUV· LQDGYHUWHQWO\
misapplying incompatible approaches to behavioural economics and to prevent inappropriate synthesis 
in academic theorization.  
 
Keywords: housing search, conceptual models, behavioural economics, institutional economics, 
ontology 
 
 
Introduction 
The policy significance of behavioural economics has risen dramatically in England since its explicit 
introduction under New Labour and then subsequently through the 2010-15 coalition (Jones et al., 2010; 
Dolan et al., 2012; Leggett, 2014), mirroring similar trends in other countries such as the Netherlands, 
the USA and Australia (Scanlon and Elsinga, 2014; Smith, 2013). The English resurgence of interest in 
EHKDYLRXUDOHFRQRPLFVFRLQFLGHVZLWKSROLF\PDNHU·VLQFUHDVLQJLQWHUHVWLQKRXVLQJPDUNHWSURFHVVHVDV
well as outcomes to support planning 0DFOHQQDQDQG2·6XOOLYDQYet, application of behavioural 
economics in English housing policy remains inconsistent. Policies such as the New Homes Bonus use 
behavioural economic language but display limited understanding of behaviour in the housing market 
and under-theorize agency in the development process (Dunning et al, 2014). Whilst contestation in the 
political process frequently leads to partial or mis-applications of behavioural economic theory in policy 
creation (Whitehead et al, 2011), another reason for its under-use is that such theory is underspecified in 
relation to housing markets and is therefore difficult to synthesize in housing policy. 
 
Behavioural economics is not a single theory. The ontological assumptions behind self-defined 
behavioural economic approaches to housing theory are not necessarily shared between those 
approaches (Watkins and McMaster, 2011). Calls to integrate studies in behavioural economics, or to 
combine them with neoclassical economics (e.g. Boelhouwer, 2011) may oversimplify the variation 
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between approaches. Any integration needs to examine whether housing theories share compatible 
ontological perspectives. An example of the variation in behavioural economic ontologies highlights this. 
Does 6FRWWDQG/L]LHUL·V experimental evidence for anchoring and arbitrary coherence in house 
price judgement share similar enough assumptions about price formation with Christie, Munro and 
6PLWK·V 8) work on emotions and price inflation, for them to be uncritically assimilated? Only a 
cursory reading would suggest that they share a similar behavioural economic philosophy. 
 
Adams and Watkins (2014) argue that, in line with the pragmatist philosophy of Haack (2004), different 
economic approaches are useful in revealing insights into aspects of housing markets and planning. This 
reinforces *X\DQG+HQQHEHUU\·VFDOOIRUPHWKRGRORJLFDOSOXUDOLVPDQG*LEE·VGHIHQFHRI
multiple economic approaches. However, whilst perspectives may be successfully harvested from the 
panoply of economic approaches (Chang, 2014), a common framework is necessary for their 
perspectives to be appropriately co-located in policy. The background and ontological commitments of 
research that seeks to provide clues about housing processes therefore need to be scrutinized before 
being admitted as corroborating evidence (McMaster and Watkins, 2006).  
 
In order to assimilate or define differences for housing policy, clarity is needed about the compatibility 
of housing market theories purporting to incorporate insights from behavioural economics. Whilst a 
complete assessment of the ontological commitments of the range of behavioural housing theories is 
impracticable, a heuristic approach can simplify and determine the key areas for understanding their 
ontological hetero- and homogeneity. Narrowing down the focus of the assessment to a single aspect of 
the expansive housing market economics canon, the housing search process, provides a useful case study 
of the variation in behavioural approaches. Housing search regularly incorporates three key variables that 
may be analysed to understand the ontologies underpinning the approach: human ability (analogous to 
agency), the housing search process (analogous to performance) and the housing market (analogous to 
structure).  
 
Human ability is normally considered to be a property of individuals, but in this paper the household is 
used, referring to the unit moving home, which, whilst a simplification, has pedigree in behavioural 
research (e.g. Ferrari et al., 2011), akin to fLUP·VRURUJDQL]DWLRQVGHFLVLRQ-making (Simon, 1972). Before 
assessing housing search models in detail we must consider an overview of behavioural positions in 
wider economic theory.  
 
Economic theory of housing search: from neoclassical to behavioural  
Behavioural economics is commonly viewed either as an alternative to or variation on neoclassical 
economics. This section will outline the main tenets of a neoclassical economics view of housing search 
before providing an overview of the behavioural economics challenges. Neoclassical economic models 
assume that households can achieve, or approximate, utility maximization in decision-making, where the 
decisions include remaining in their current premises. At any moment in time a dwelling reflects the 
optimal relationship between household preferences, housing characteristics, financial constraints and 
market prices. The search process is therefore only of limited interest to neoclassical economics as 
outputs explain preferences and markets are assumed to be in equilibrium, or moving towards it.  
 
Whilst economists have regularly demurred from the tenets of homo economicus and neoclassical 
economics views of the market (including Smith, 1759 and Veblen, 1899) it was not until the latter half 
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of the twentieth century that behavioural economics became recognized as an alternative to rational 
utility maximization. Herbert Simon was a catalyst in cohering an alternative behavioural approach (Sent, 
2004). Simon·V (1978) theory that consumers satisfice rather than maximize was a direct challenge. 
Satisficing households were no longer assumed to make optimal decisions. Instead they choose 
acceptable dwellings from the array of opportunities because of limitations on their ability to maximize 
utility. These limitations may relate to cognitive complexity, problems in acquiring information or the 
structure of market relations and are summarized by the term ´bounded rationalityµ.  
 
Within a behavioural economics approach the search process becomes of increasing significance, 
because information is not known a priori but needs to be collected, collated and weighed up, which 
may result in a suboptimal move. Preferences may shift with new information and are not static, but may 
revolve around broader aspirations (e.g. for comfort) and may contradict each other (e.g. wanting a 
larger dwelling that is, at the same time more intimate or homely).  
 
The extent to which the assumptions in behavioural economics are compatible with those in neoclassical 
economics is, however, disputed. Herbert Simon argued that the flaws in homo economicus create a 
disjuncture: ´, VKDOO DVVXPH WKDW WKH FRQFHSW RI ´HFRQRPLF PDQµ DQG , PLJKW DGG KLV EUother 
´DGPLQLVWUDWLYHPDQµLV in need of fairly drastic UHYLVLRQµ6LPRQ3 This view led to Simon 
being marginalized, and to a resurgent form of behavioural economics with closer links to neoclassical 
economics assumptions, which largely supplanted 6LPRQ·V view in the mainstream (Wilkinson, 2008). 
The strand of behavioural economics that views households in a similar way to neoclassical economics is 
most clearly articulated by Camerer and Loewenstein (2004), and is sometimes refereed to as new 
behavioural economics: 
At the core of behavioral economics is the conviction that increasing the realism of the 
psychological underpinnings of economic analysis will improve economics on its own terms«. 
This conviction does not imply a wholesale rejection of the neoclassical approach to economics 
based on utility maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency. (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004, P.3). 
The bifurcation between 6LPRQ·V and /RHZHQVWHLQ·V views is clear, with one seeking distance from 
neoclassical economics and the other proximity to it. Whilst recognising this bifurcation is not 
ubiquitous, some authors have endorsed its existence. Sent (2004) suggests that the work of David 
Laibson, George Loewenstein, Colin Camerer and Matthew Rabin, building on the work of Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky is symptomatic of the new perspective, whilst old behavioural economists are 
exemplified by the work of Richard Cyert, James March and evidently Herbert Simon. The distinction 
between the two views is that old behavioural economics is concerned with describing actual behaviour and 
providing empirical evidence of the shape of the utility function, whilst new behavioural economics is 
concerned with finding deviations from the neoclassical model of behaviour that may be used to 
enhance the predictive power of those models (Sent, 2004). Angner and Loewenstein (2012) also 
differentiate between old (exemplified in the work of Herbert Simon and George Katona) and new 
behavioural economics (exemplified in the work of Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler), 
which grew out of behavioural decision research and broadly accepts the conception of rationality found 
in neoclassical economics. Ferrari et al (2011) and Watkins and McMaster (2011) likewise endorse this 
bifurcation, classifying the groups as new behavioural economics and original/old behavioural economics 
respectively, drawing attention to the relationship between old behavioural economics and old institutional 
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economics. In doing this they highlight the social relationship between agents and market norms, defending 
old behavioural economics from the critique that SimoQ·VZRUNPLQLPLVHG the role of social structures (e.g. by 
Bourdieu, cited in Swedberg, 2011). The old behavioural economics approach therefore is more closely 
aligned to cultural economy approaches to housing markets (e.g. Smith et al., 2006, Wallace, 2008, 
Munro and Smith, 2008) and conceptualises housing decisions as being socially constructed within a 
wider market context (Leggett, 2014). Jackson and Watkins (2011) argue that new behavioural economics 
does not offer an alternative to rational choice, whilst old behavioural economics VXSSRUWV ¶SURFHGXUDO·
rationality, in which satisficing behaviour reflects embedded relationships and habits impact upon beliefs 
and attitudes. 
New behavioural economics is currently the dominant form of behavioural economics and insights frequently 
migrate between neoclassical economics and new behavioural economics. The porous nature of the 
boundaries between new behavioural and neoclassical economics may be seen in *HQHVRYH DQG0D\HU·V
(2001) work on loss aversion in seller behaviour in the Boston housing market. It represents an 
ontologically consistent application of concepts from both neoclassical and new behavioural economics. 
Indeed the future of housing research is likely to reveal many advances in the synthesis between 
neoclassical and behavioural approaches through modelling housing markets (Gibb and Price, 2012). 
However, to understand the diversity within behavioural economics, and to assess the commonality in 
philosophical presuppositions between behavioural approaches and neoclassical economics the new-old 
distinction is a helpful micro-taxonomy. It may be used to question whether it is possible to assimilate all 
branches of behavioural research without raising questions about the fundamental axioms of human 
ability, choice processes and the market. However, this taxonomy risks masking the nuances of variation 
between the array of ontological commitments present in behavioural research. Using the analogy of 
distance from neoclassical economics we can envisage a spectrum of approaches from the neoclassical 
economics· tenets of rational utility maximisation to socially embedded and satisficing behaviour. This 
paints a more complete picture of the similarities and differences between various behavioural 
economics approaches. Tomer (2007) describes a spectrum of positions covering eight distinct strands 
of thought within behavioural economics (Harvey Leibenstein, experimental economics, psychological 
economics, George Katona, George Akerlof, Herbert Simon, evolutionary theory, and behavioural 
finance). He compares the philosophy of science within each to that of mainstream economics in 
relation to the following variables: narrowness, rigidity, intolerance, mechanicalness, separateness and 
individualism.  
 
7RPHU·V six-strand spectrum is unwieldy in practice and is more suitable to analyzing aQDXWKRU·V
complete body of work rather than specific papers. A simplified version however can also reveal 
variation. This heuristic approach identifies three key ontological elements: the KRXVHKROG·V decision 
making ability (agency); the housing search process (process); and the housing market (structure). The 
three elements are explored further in Figure 1 below. Each element is considered along a spectrum 
rather than clear categorization which allows for variation in the behavioural emphases between the 
three elements within a model. It also enables the practitioner to visualize the ontological similarities and 
differences before deciding if insights from the studies are compatible.  
 
Figure 1. Divergent approaches to human ability; housing search processes; and the housing market 
across neoclassical, new and old behavioural economics 
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Source: author 
Change in housing search models 
The analysis is applied to five models of housing search. These models have been selected as examples 
of the range of perspectives from neoclassical economics (Tu & Goldfinch, 1996) through four 
variations of behavioural economics models presented chronologically: Speare, Goldstein and Frey 
(1975); Maclennan (1982); Wong (2002); and Marsh and Gibb (2011). 
 
Tu and Goldfinch, 1996 
Tu DQG*ROGILQFK·VZRUNUHSUHVHQWVDneoclassical model of housing search, but is interesting in 
this context as it discusses behavioural economics, and explores some of the assumptions of neoclassical 
economics explicitly. It assumes that the household has incomplete information at the beginning of the 
search process, but through the search process obtains perfect information and is then able to maximize 
its utility (or at least satisfice with complete information). This conceptualization of human ability is that 
home EX\HUV· are independent, rational utility maximisers´buying a dwelling is the largest expenditure 
and probably one of the biggest deFLVLRQVWKDWDKRXVHKROGPDNHV«it is reasonable to assume that each 
buyer will buy a dwelling only after obtaining full market informationµ (Tu and Goldfinch, 1996, 
PP.519-520) and later:  
The decision to buy a dwelling will be made when the buyer has obtained full market 
information. If this buyer is a rational buyer, he/she will be able to estimate correctly the utility 
KHVKHFDQREWDLQIURPHDFKGZHOOLQJDQGWKHEX\HU·VFKRLFHZLOOEHKLVKHUPD[LPXPXWLOLW\
choice dwelling (Tu & Goldfinch, 1996, P.521) 
The language of choice is used, however as preferences are assumed to be fixed and full information is 
obtained this choice amounts to a simple selection process, reflecting the neoclassical approach (Ferrari 
et al, 2011). The process does not influence the stopping point, or outcome given stable preferences and 
full information. In essence Tu and Goldfinch (1996) assume that humans have the ability to obtain and 
process the complete information set and that the institutional structure is such that there is no barrier 
to obtaining it.   
¶+RXVLQJVHDUFK·LVDVLPSOHER[WKHPHFKDQLVPVRIZKLFKDUHQRWRILQWHUHVWThere is little in the paper 
about the housing market, or the role of market actors such as estate agents, presenting a mechanistic 
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neoclassical economics understanding of the market rather than a culturally performed and socially 
constructed understanding (e.g. Smith et al., 2006). This typical neoclassical economics approach relies 
on a clear ontological commitment to ordered preferences, the ability to retrieve and compute all 
relevant information, inconsequential processes and the transparency of the housing market.  
)LJXUH7X	*ROGILQFK·VRQWRORJ\LQUHODWLRQWRNH\EHKDYLRXUDOHFRQRPLFVHOHPHQWV 
  
Source: author 
 
 
Speare, Goldstein and Frey, 1975 
As behavioural economics emerged partly as a critique of neoclassical economics with regard to human 
ability, process and markets, we should expect some variation in these elements in behavioural models of 
housing search. Speare, Goldstein and Frey (1975) situate their work explicitly in relation to Herbert 
6LPRQ·VZRUN. One way to combat cognitive limitations is for the household to construct a simplified 
model of the housing market and of their decision and then act rationally with regards to that model 
(procedural rationality). 
 
Following Brown and Moore (1970) they separate the housing search process into three detailed stages: 
determinants of consideration to move; result of the search process; and the decision to move or stay. 
Citing Simon, their model can be seen to be procedurally rational, in that the household determines a 
course of action, which may be suboptimal and then acts rationally with regard to it. There is little 
discussion of the housing search process, suggesting that whilst human ability is viewed as sub-optimal 
the process itself is not considered to be a function and feature of that bounded rationality. 
 
This model explores satisfaction thresholds, drawing on :ROSHUW·V EHKDYLRUDO JHRJUDSK\ work (1965) 
and rejects utility maximization. This is because households do not search continuously, instead their 
search is triggered after becoming aware that a threshold of dissatisfaction or of the potential to realize 
an aspiration has been passed (Mulder, 1996). Speare et al (1975) also assume that househoOGV·DZDUHQHVV
of information is constrained and consequently, they reject the full market information outlined by 
neoclassical economics models.  
In contrast to Tu and Goldfinch (1996), Speare et al (1975) argue that actors and institutions influence 
search processes and outcomes through DFWRUV· descriptions of the housing market and relationships 
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with households. These relationships may have a significant role in guiding WKHKRXVHKROG·VDZDUHQHVVof 
housing opportunities and neighbourhood characteristics and therefore the decision making process. 
This approach is not made explicit in the diagrammatic model in 6SHDUHHWDO·V paper and there is 
only limited evidence in the text that the housing market will influence outcomes as well as processes.   
)LJ6SHDUH*ROGVWHLQDQG)UH\·VRQWRORJ\LQUHODWLRQWRNH\EHKDYLRXUDOHFRQRPLFVHOHPHQWV 
 
Source: author  
 
 
Maclennan, 1982 
'XQFDQ0DFOHQQDQ·VERRNHousing Economics (1982) encouraged an incremental change in the adoption 
of institutional and behavioural approaches in housing economics. Published in the same year that 
&ODUN·VHGLWHGERRNModelling Housing Market Search (1982), Maclennan expresses and extends the intent 
to create a new approach to conceptualizing housing search. Whilst not drawing explicitly on 
behavioural economics, the implications are clear DQGOHGFRPPHQWDWRUVWRFRQVLGHU0DFOHQQDQ·VZRUN
to be a behavioural economics approach (Clark, 2011; Needham et al., 2011). The focus on micro 
economic behaviour and housing search provide signs of variation from neoclassical economics, but not 
the complete break preferred by Herbert Simon. There is little focus explicitly on human ability and in 
this regard 0DFOHQQDQ·V ZRUN DOLJQV ZLWK new behavioural economics. This is confirmed in the model 
framework characteristics: ´the appropriate specification of the structure of the housing choice decision 
VKRXOGPHDQWKDW¶EHKDYLRXUDO·DQG¶QHRFODVVLFDO·PRGHOVVKRXOGQRORQJHUEHVHHQDVSRODUDOWHUQDWLYHV
but that they tend to converge as the decision structure is appropriately specifiedµ(Maclennan, 1982, 
PP.66). 
 
The search process includes extensive and intensive stages. The extensive search stage is related to both 
the household·V initial preferences and its revised aspirations in an iterative process as the household 
adjusts tits expectations depending on the types of housing opportunity presented. The intensive 
housing and finance search stages flow from the extensive search stage as individual dwellings are 
considered in detail (within defined area and financial parameters). Maclennan acknowledges that 
distinguishing empirically between the extensive and intensive phases is problematic. The intensive 
phase feeds directly into the bid formation and offer process.  
 8 
 
The model acknowledges that a household may endure a sustained search process, working recursively 
through the boxes. The manner in which the household is described as doing this, however, implies that 
moves from one rational step to another. Consider a household viewing a dwelling, engaged in intensive 
search, but at the same time asking questions about their aspirations and preferences. It may be through 
the actual experience of viewing a dwelling that a household determines whether it is prepared to trade 
one housing attribute IRUDQRWKHU7KHUHIRUHZKLOVW0DFOHQQDQ·VVFKHPDWLFSURYLGHVPRUHHYLGHQFHRI
the importance of aspects of the housing search process, it does not explicitly extend an explanation of 
the influence the process itself can have on outcomes.  
 
The behaviouraODQG LQVWLWXWLRQDOHOHPHQWVRI0DFOHQQDQ·VPRGHOHQWDLODEHWWHUGHVFULSWLRQRI human 
behavior and the unique characteristics of housing: infrequency of home owners acting in the market (as 
buyers or sellers); the complex bundle of characteristics comprising a house; the geography of housing; 
DQG WKH GLIILFXOW\ LQ REWDLQLQJ DSSURSULDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ &ODUN  0DFOHQQDQ·V  PRGHO JRHV
some way to incorporating these concerns. Take for example the gathering of information about 
opportunities. The household brings aspirations to the extensive search phase, but the housing market 
institutions also impact on that phase in a recursive relationship. Maclennan argues that housing market 
context will differ from decision to decision (for example depending on institutional arrangements as 
well as macro economic conditions) and that in some cases markets will be in disequilibrium. 
)LJ0DFOHQQDQ·VRQWRORJ\LQUHODWLRQWRNH\EHKDYLRXUDOHFRQRPLFVHOHPHQWV 
 
Source: author 
 
 
Wong, 2002 
Wong (2002) develops a more behaviourally rich discussion of human ability than Maclennan, applying 
6LPRQ·VFRQFHSWRIVDWLVILFLQJWRVHDUFK 
 instead of searching for the best alternative that could be time-consuming or even impossible in 
view of imperfect information and uncertainty of events, the decision-maker is usually concerned 
with finding an alternative that satisfies his preferences. This heuristic search for alternatives 
EDVLFDOO\LOOXVWUDWHVWKHHVVHQFHRI´WKHXWLOLW\VDWLVILFLQJPRGHOµ:RQJ3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Like Speare, Goldstein and Frey (1975) the application of stress threshold levels to the decision to move 
LQ :RQJ·V PRGHO LV DQ H[DPSOH RI DSSO\LQJ D behavioural economics approach to human ability. 
Households do not continuously appraise their housing. Rather, a search is triggered when a stress 
threshold level is crossed in their current dwelling. :RQJ·V PRGHO KRZHYHU UHWDLQV perspectives on 
human ability that conflict with neoclassical economics. The deVLUHWRILQG¶EHVWYDOXHIRUPRQH\·, Wong 
argues, is more akin to utility maximization than satisficing. Wong applies this mix of satisficing and 
utility maximization to a two-stage housing search process (the decision to move, then the selection of a 
new residence). A household creates a shortened list of preferred housing attributes, against which 
opportunities are evaluated. The stages of the decision require ranking of preferences, evaluating 
alternatives against set preferences and feedback loops (Wong, 2002). This approach, intended to be 
procedurally rational, includes the types of decision inherent in the standard economic approach, and 
similar forms of decision-making (e.g. ranking of housing preferences) but in a form that acknowledges 
greater computational complexity and is based on less information. 
 
Whilst Wong uses behavioural language, such as heuristics and satisficing, the terms are not applied 
consistently across to the housing search process. For example, she describes search as a heuristic 
process but does not define what the shortcut means or what impact it has on the search output. 
Satisficing is applied to the decision to move and to the selection of attributes to be considered, but not 
to the search process itself (for example the information sources). In this context the shortcomings of 
0DFOHQQDQ·VZRrk on human ability are partially dealt with but are not applied consistently. 
 
:RQJ·V  PRGHO DVVXPHV WKDW WKH KRXVLQJ PDUNHW GRHV QRW LPSDFW RQ WKH VHDUFK SURFHVV
Institutions and agents reveal the range of housing characteristics to choose from, although she 
recognizes that supply may constrain choice. The decision making process is therefore conceptualized as 
independent of the housing market. 
 
:KLOVW DOO FRQFHSWXDO PRGHOV DUH VLPSOLILFDWLRQV DQG DEVWUDFWLRQV :RQJ·V  PRGHO takes 
incompatible elements of both satisficing and neoclassical economics approaches, and therefore lacks an 
internally consistent explanation of human ability, the search process and the housing market. One 
example of this is her treatment of the decision to select a new residence or improve a current residence, 
which is arguably the insertion of a binary option where one does not exist. A household may continue 
to search for properties whilst enhancing their current dwelling, this may be a utility maximizing rational 
process in order to increase the price of their existing dwelling, but may also simultaneously represent 
current and attempted future satisficing.  
)LJ:RQJ·VRQWRORJ\LQUHODWLRQWRNH\EHKDYLRXUDOHFRQRPLFVHOHPHQWV 
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Source: author 
 
 
Marsh and Gibb, 2011 
Marsh and Gibb (2011) argue that the neoclassical economic theory of decision-making under 
uncertainty does not hold for housing markets. Aligning their model with Maclennan (1982), they argue 
for the application of all robust behavioural (and institutional) insights about human decision-making to 
be applied to housing search, rather than singular insights applied to a mainstream approach. Decision-
PDNHUV·FRJQLWLYHSRZHULVDVFDUFHUHVRXUFHDQGVLPSOHUGHFLVLRQ-making rules are necessary for most 
decisions including those relating to the selection of search strategy, area orientation, establishing 
vacancies, visiting vacancies, evaluating in detail, and forming and placing a bid. The components are 
not-necessarily sequential, and decision-making occurs throughout these components meaning that 
someone may enter a housing search process and leave without working through the whole, or may 
repeat components.  
 
Marsh and Gibb (2011) frame institutional considerations by highlighting the significance of market 
conditions on the selection of a search strategy7KH\VXJJHVW WKDW LQDEX\HUV·PDUNHWKRXVLQJVHDUFK
PD\ EH OHVV LQWHQVH WKDQ LQ D VHOOHUV· PDUNHW DV WKH IXOO UDQJH RI YDFDQFLHV PD\ EH YLHZHG SULRU WR
PDNLQJDGHFLVLRQ,QDVHOOHUV·market the searcher is less likely to be able to view all of the vacancies 
before they are purchased, hence time constraints lead to more intense and selective search behaviour. 
As the cost of search (intensity) increases the household is more likely to follow suboptimal rules of 
behaviour in their search. This links clearly to Herbert Simon·V YLHZ RI G\QDPLF DVSLUDWLRQ OHYHOV LQ
housing search: 
The aspiration level, which defines a satisfactory alternative, may change from point to point in 
the sequence of trials. A vague principal would be that as the individual, in his exploration of 
alternatives, finds it easy to discover satisfactory alternatives, his aspiration level rises; as he finds 
it difficult to discover satisfactory alternatives his aspiration level falls. (Simon, 1955, P.111) 
 
Like previous models, whilst extolling the likelihood of rules of behaviour Marsh and Gibb (2011) do 
not indicate what these rules might be, or how these rules or habits are learnt or changed. A more 
institutionally rich discussion of how behaviour is constructed and performed in the housing market 
should cover the role of intermediaries and the media in influencing expectations of search length and 
intensity. A more behaviourally rich approach may also consider how rules are adapted and consider 
intensity as a flexible concept throughout the search process. An old behavioural economics approach 
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questions whether households rationally select search strategies (information sources, intensity etc), 
suggesting that households pursue norms of behavior and engagement and adapt the search strategy as it 
proves more or less fruitful. ,Q6LPRQ·VTheories of Bounded Rationality, a chess game is considered 
analogous to strategizing and the competing rational and bounded rational approaches are discussed. 
6LPRQGHILQHVWKHVWUDWHJ\SUREOHPDV´RQHRIILQGLQJDVHWRIDFFXUDWHHYDOXDWLRQVIRUWKHDOWHUQDWLYH
PRYHVLPPHGLDWHO\EHIRUHWKHSOD\HUµ6LPRQ35HMHFWLQJWKHUDWLRQDODSSURDFKthat is able 
to compute all of the possible permutations of moves on the chessboard, Simon suggests that a more 
realistic approach in chess is to select a move (i.e. the next stage that satisfices the aspirations of the player 
rather than a complete strategy). This approach suggests that in housing search far from selecting an 
over-arching search strategy (where the amount and quality of housing opportunities is unknown), 
households are more likely to select individual heuristic events of housing search (e.g. looking in an 
estate agents window), and routinely undertake new search events as they re-analyse (with partial, but 
potentially increasing knowledge) opportunities, aspirations and constraints in the housing market. A 
bounded rationality approach therefore may be more akin to a trial-and-error approach than rational 
strategic decision-making.  
 
Area orientation LV D IXOO\ LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG FRQFHSW LQ 0DUVK DQG *LEE·V  DFFRXQW ZLWK VRFLDO
signals and culturally referenced aspirations the norm amongst homebuyers. These socio-cultural aspects 
will have an influence on the areas and tenures considered by a household, and may prevent switching 
between areas and tenures regardless of financial optimization. Marsh and Gibb (2011) combine 
discussion of personally visiting vacancies and evaluating dwellings in detail. Their approach is a retort to 
7XDQG*ROGILQFK·V PRGHO DQG to the possibility of a buyer being able correctly to predict the 
utility they will obtain from purchasing a house: 
evaluating a dwelling as a potential home involves constructing a scenario regarding what life ² 
in all its diverse aspects ² will be like in a particular location. It may also involve trying to make 
an assessment of the likely saleability of the property at some indistinct point in the future. 
Importantly, it is upon the basis of these scenarios that choices are made: where future prospects 
are inaccuUDWHO\ SHUFHLYHG FKRLFH PD\ DSSHDU IURP VRPH ´REMHFWLYHµ YLHZSRLQW RU ZLWK
hindsight, perverse and the decision maker may miss the global, or even local, optimum (Marsh 
and Gibb, 2011, PP.224-225) 
 
Marsh and Gibb include in the idea of satisficing the complexity of imagining utility. The experience of 
living in a home can only be projected by a household. Whilst the accuracy of these projections is likely 
to be enhanced by personally visiting the properties, households can only rely on lived experience 
outwith the opportunity, on partial information and on speculation. Where information is difficult to 
obtain, or where information masks the likely lived experience of the household, projections may be less 
realistic. These perceptions again may be less realistic in the case of long-distance movers who have not 
experienced living in the locality. This is contrasted to a classical concept of rationality, which suggests 
that the household need not know the definitive experience, but must know the definitive range of 
experiences (pay-offs). A behavioural economics reply questions not whether the household can 
accurately predict the definitive experience level, but whether they can predict the precise range of 
experiences that will occur. 0DUVK DQG *LEE·V PRGHO is further towards the old behavioural end of the 
spectrum than previous models, though it does retain some new behavioural hangovers from neoclassical 
economics. More detail could also be added to the role of institutions in the housing market, which 
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would mark a further distinction between the model and the individualism of new behavioural economics 
approaches (Clapham, 2011).  
)LJ0DUVK	*LEE·VRQWRORJ\LQUHODWLRQWRNH\EHKDYLRXUDOHFRQRPLFVHOHPHQWV 
 
Source: author 
 
 
Other conceptual models 
In addition to the five conceptual models outlined, many other models have made significant 
contributions to the development of housing search conceptualizations from across the spectrum. Two 
papers are considered briefly to highlight these contributions. Levy and Lee (2004) dissect the household 
decision making unit by considering the role of individual family members across the search process. 
Using a five-stage approach to the decision-making process (problem recognition, product specification, 
search, evaluation of alternatives and final choice) they conceptualize family members in different roles, 
for example the men specifying location requirements and women the physical requirements. This 
reflects culturally embedded norms of behavior, wherein roles differ across groups in society. The issue 
here is not the precise roles, rather their work reveals that not only are aspirations and preferences 
culturally formed, but the decision making process internally is itself culturally formed.  
 
Rae·V (2014) model of housing search directly addresses the nexus of growth in online search and 
behavioural conceptualisations by constructing a new model to support empirical work on online search 
EHKDYLRUWKHHIIHFWVRIZKLFKDUHFXUUHQWO\XQGHUUHVHDUFKHG'XQQLQJDQG*UD\VRQ,Q6LPRQ·V
(1972) essay on bounded rationality one of the limits on rationality is the amount of information 
available to an actor. Simon considers both incomplete choice sets and incomplete consequence sets. 
With the rise of Internet based multiple listing services it is conceivable that in some markets the website 
hosts the complete choice set1. In this instance, incomplete information about consequences may pose a 
ODUJHUFKDOOHQJHWRHFRQRPLFPDQWKDQDOWHUQDWLYHV5DH·VPRGHOVXJJHVWVWKDW, in this context, housing 
search should not now be viewed as a single intensity process, and that there is a distinction between the 
ability of a household to undertake housing search virtually and physically to view properties and to deal 
                                                        
1 There is a caveat to this claim. This view does not consider time, and the delays between a dwelling becoming 
available and marketed online. In slow markets this may be of little concern, but it is feasible that in hot markets 
the dwelling may be transacted before the details have been submitted online. This may be more likely in the 
rental market than in the freehold market, where time may be of greater significance. 
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with estate agents. The concepts of time and intensity have frequently played little part in housing search 
conceptualisations, and are to date under theorized and have little empirical support.   
 
 
Discussion 
The growing acceptance of heterodox economics accounts, and in particular those with behavioural 
antecedents, has enabled greater variety in the philosophical perspectives underpinning housing search 
theory and in practice in housing policy. This paper explores the variation between behavioural 
economics models of housing search across three key elements: human ability; the search process; and, 
the housing market. These variations can be seen clearly when located on a spectrum from neoclassical 
economics to old behavioural economics (see Figure 7). In this light it is evident that there is an array of 
behavioural perspectives, which vary considerably and are not all mutually compatible. Whilst the 
heterogeneity in behavioural models has been evidenced, the interpretation of philosophical 
presuppositions represented here is partial and not all aspects of the models presented require 
uniformity of commitment. Further analysis exploring the philosophical positions in these papers could 
shift them to the left or right of the spectrum.  
Figure. 7. A perspective on the theoretical position of search models presented in this paper 
 
Source: author 
 
Whilst this spectrum might suggest that there has been an incremental approach to adopting behavioural 
economics, the movement has not been fluid. In line with the variations in philosophical 
presuppositions between factions of behavioural economics there has been no coherent temporal 
movement to either a new behavioural perspective or an original/old behavioural perspective. However, it 
should be recognized that the most prevalent form of behavioural theory in housing economics is 
closely aligned to new behavioural economics. Few behavioural economics studies explicitly outline their 
ontological commitments, which hinders comparison and rigorous testing of their ability to be 
synthesized.   
 
Given this lack of uniformity and clarity in approaches, the potential for policy makers to absorb 
incompatible insights into policy is evidenced here through two examples. Whilst both new and old 
behavioural economics XVHWKHWHUP¶ERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\·, their views of human ability in some cases lead to 
inconsistent approaches. The new behavioural economics human acts with limited knowledge to maximize 
their utility, perhaps through the use of a cost benefit calculation, albeit with computational limits or 
heuristics. Whereas, the old behavioural economics human is a satisficer whose situation reflects a socially and 
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culturally embedded notion of housing that is ¶JRRGHQRXJK·7KLVGLIIHUHQce produces different views 
RIWKHOHYHODQGFDSDFLW\RIILQDQFLDOLQFHQWLYHVWRDGMXVWDKRXVHKROG·VKRXVLQJFRQVXPSWLRQ7DNHWKH
Voluntary Right to Buy policy as an example; it is designed to encourage social tenants to become home 
owners through a financial incentive. In order to have a large-scale impact, in new behavioural economics an 
appropriate incentive for tenants is the minimum amount to adjust the cost benefit analysis in favour of 
ownership (taking into account mortgage capacity, policy awareness and framing effects). An old view 
argues that the amount required will need to be above the minimum cost-benefit amount, in order to 
overcome KRXVHKROGV·LQKHUHQWVDWLVILFLQJEHKDYLRXU, otherwise households may not take up the scheme 
despite missing the optimal utility from an objective point of view.  
 
Second, housing search evidently involves the process of gathering of information. Making price paid 
data freely available from the Land Registry in England has increased the perspicuity of price 
information significantly. From both new and old behavioural perspectives this information is likely to have 
an impact upon search behaviour and outcomes, however the extent of this impact upon the efficiency 
of the market varies. New behavioural economics points out that a range of systematic heuristics (e.g. 
anchoring and loss aversion) will continue to impinge upon the search process even with greater 
availability of information. Old behavioural economics suggests that socially constructed local market 
structures LQFOXGLQJWKHLQIOXHQFHRIORFDO¶H[SHUWV·VXFKDVHVWDWHDJHQWV, emotionally shaped cognitive 
limitations and impressionistic understandings will be a greater limit on the impact that open 
information may have than a new behavioural approach. These types of discrepancies evidence clear 
differences in the housing search process. A satisficer who is heavily influenced by social and cultural 
market institutions will not experience the same search process as an optimizer with cognitive limitations 
and pose limitations therefore to their ability to be assimilated in housing policy.  
 
Utilising the heuristic approach outlined in this paper will make the ontological variation in behavioural 
housing studies more transparent. This transparency should also support greater academic rigour in 
housing search theory as the internal consistency of conceptions of human ability, the search process 
and markets are interrogated. A re-defined empirical programme addressing aspects only weakly 
specified currently (e.g. area orientation, changes in information sources and trust relations as well as 
variations in search behavior between household types) would provide evidence for the potential 
tractability of either a new or old approach. When this theoretical and empirical heavy lifting has been 
undertaken we will be in a better place to support the creation and critique of housing policy.  
Behavioural economics remains a potentially fruitful avenue for research in housing and useful insights 
have come from all positions on the spectrum presented. However, clarity and openness is needed from 
all behavioural economists about the form of their theoretical underpinnings if insights are to be 
combined. Criticism of behavioural economics must similarly recognize the variation between 
behavioural stances and specify with precision both their critiques and the type of behavioural 
economics that the critique addresses.  
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